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COMMENTS
TO POLICE THE POLICE: FUNCTIONAL




Concern for the environment is a compelling current issue.' Advances
1. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 53-54 (1980) (discussion of environ-
mental hazards to be addressed under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Corn-
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in technology have brought great benefits, but have produced an unwanted
by-product: increasing amounts of hazardous waste.2 Congress has been
impelled to act to head off environmental disaster and to initiate efforts
toward environmental improvement.3
In 1969 Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).4 NEPA has two major purposes: (1) to require careful consider-
ation by each federal agency of the environmental effects of agency action
that has a substantial environmental impact, and (2) to provide meaningful
opportunity for public participation in the agency's process of reaching its
ultimate decision about such an action.5 To fulfill NEPA's requirements, a
federal agency must ordinarily prepare an environmental impact statement
(EIS).6 An EIS is filed with and examined by the Environmental Protec-
pensation and Liability (Superfund) Act of 1980) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT ON
SUPERFUND].
2. Id. at 19, 21-22.
3. See S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969) (discussion of purpose of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT ON
NEPAl; see also Jackson, Foreword, Environmental Quality, the Courts, and the Congress, 68
MICH. L. REV. 1073, 1081-82 (1970) (discussion by NEPA's sponsor of the need for govern-
ment agencies to balance emphasis on commerce and technology with concern for a healthy
environment); Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9-11 (1982)
(partial list of environmental statutes).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
5. Id.
6. The EIS, a structured analytic report, is the ordinary means for NEPA compliance.
The report may run several thousand pages and is prepared through a carefully regulated
process. See infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text. It is based upon the five core issues
set forth in sections 102(2)(C)(i)-(v) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v) (1982), which
provide that an EIS must address the following areas:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action;
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the pro-
posal be implemented;
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action;
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be impicmented.
Id.
The EIS process exposes the agency's plan to public scrutiny and comment through struc-
tured procedures designed to give notice and elicit response. See infra notes 54-6 1. Regula-
tions governing the preparation of an EIS are codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 15 (1983). They are
promulgated by the President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), a three-member
council created pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4346 (1982). In addition to promulgating the
regulations for EIS preparation, the CEQ must report annually to the President on the state
of the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1982). CEQ regulations provide that under certain
circumstances alternatives to the EIS meet NEPA's requirements. For example, in an emer-




The EIS fulfills the underlying purposes of NEPA in two ways. First,
preparation of an EIS requires application of a specific format, set forth in
NEPA's section 102(2)(C), 8 to ensure a careful balancing of the adverse
environmental effects of the proposed agency action against the benefit
sought through that action.9 Second, the EIS procedure offers an opportu-
nity for public participation in an agency's deliberation and choices,
thereby providing useful information to the agency and promoting reason-
able agency decisions based on consideration of all responsible views.' °
Through its content and procedural process the EIS is designed, ulti-
mately, to prevent agency errors resulting in avoidable harm to the envi-
ronment." Thus, the EIS serves Congress's intent in enacting NEPA: to
make the federal government a model citizen in its relationship to the en-
vironment.' 2 Through implementation of NEPA, Congress sought to fos-
ter public confidence in federal agencies and the environmental soundness
of their actions.'
3
What the EPA must do to comply with NEPA is at the center of a de-
bate over the EPA's planned enforcement of Superfund legislation.' 4
companying text. Or the environmental assessment (EA), the initial evaluation of the
environmental impact of the agency's plan, may result in a "finding of no substantial im-
pact" (FONSI), relieving the agency of its obligation to prepare an EIS. See infra notes 52-
53.
7. The EPA was established under Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, effective Dec. 2,
1970, 84 Stat. 2086 (noted at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982)). Copies of a final EIS prepared by any
federal agency are filed with the EPA. See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.9 (1983); see also infra note 58
and accompanying text.
8. See discussion supra note 6.
9. See SENATE REPORT ON NEPA, supra note 3, at 5; see also Jackson, supra note 3, at
1079. The late Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) was a primary sponsor of NEPA. See
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 921 (1974) (tracing Sen. Jackson's role as sponsor of NEPA).
10. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S.
139, 143 (1981) (even where defense concerns made full EIS procedure impossible, public
must be informed that the environment has been considered); California v. Block, 690 F.2d
753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982) (significant opportunity for public participation must be present for
functional equivalence to an EIS).
11. See generally Jackson, supra note 3.
12. See H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 2754: "[T]here is a real need to involve State and local planning and action
agencies, whose activities play a major part on [sic] the overall environmental problem, in
the decisionmaking process." Id; see Jackson, supra note 3, at 1075.
13. Id.
14. Memorandum from EPA General Counsel on Applicability of Section 102(2) (C) of
NEP4 to Superfund ResponseActions, [1982 Transfer Binder] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 709 (Sept.
17, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum]; see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA,
No. 82-1224 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 14, 1982); New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. EPA,
1984]
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Superfund is a comprehensive statutory scheme authorizing cleanup of
abandoned hazardous waste sites where release of hazardous substances
into the environment is actually occurring or threatens to occur.' 5
Superfund authorizes the EPA to take three types of cleanup actions: re-
moval, planned removal, and remedial. 16 All three actions have a substan-
tial impact upon the environment and thus fall within NEPA.
1 7
The EPA's cleanup actions are, of course, intended to enhance the envi-
ronment. Yet some cleanup methods themselves are a potential source of
further harm. An inappropriate choice of cleanup technique can cause ac-
tual physical damage equal to, or graver than, the dangerous situation the
No. 82-2238 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 14, 1982) (pending NEPA challenges to Superfund
regulations).
15. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(Superfund), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-4682 (1982)
and 42 U.S.C. §§ 691 la, 9601-9657 (1982)). That portion of the Act codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9657 is the focus of this Comment. Those provisions authorize the EPA to identify
and institute cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste sites, and establish the Superfund to
finance those cleanup actions. Anyone who has ever generated or transported the hazardous
waste or, at the time of disposal, owned the site, or now owns the site, is a "responsible
party," and is strictly liable for cleanup costs incurred by Superfund. United States v. Reilly
Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1119 (D. Minn. 1982) (Congress intended absolute
liability under § 107(a)). See also Comment, Generator Liability under Superfundfor Clean-
up of/Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dumpsites, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1229 (1982); D. WEIN-
BERG, G. GOLDMAN, & S. BRIGGUM, HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION HANDBOOK, chs. 6,
8, 11 (1982). The National Contingency Plan (NCP) is the name given the regulations im-
plementing Superfund. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1983).
Section 104 of Superfund authorizes the President to act "consistent with the national
contingency plan" to arrange removal or remedial action. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982). See
infra note 16 and accompanying text for discussion of types of response actions. This provi-
sion, along with language in § 105, providing that the NCP "shall establish procedures and
standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants
(42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982)), incorporates the NCP into the statute.
16. "Removal" is defined as "actions ... necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate
damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result
from a release or threat of release [of hazardous material]." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1982).
"Release" is defined, in part, as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, empty-
ing, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment
.42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982). See 40 C.F.R. § 300.65 (1983).
"Planned removal" is not included within the provisions of Superfund, but is defined in
the NCP as a permanent, long-term remedy carried out at the site of a removal action once
imminent danger has been mitigated. For planned removal, the EPA must determine that
there would be "a substantial cost savings by continuing a response action with the equip-
ment and resources mobilized for an immediate removal ..... 40 C.F.R. § 300.67(1)
(1983).
"Remedial" actions have been described by the EPA as those that normally "address
situations that do not require an immediate or expedited response and therefore allow for
the time necessary to conduct detailed planning and evaluation." Memorandum, supra note
14, at 711. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.68 (1983).
17. See supra note 12; Memorandum, supra note 14, at 709-10.
Superfund
agency seeks to ameliorate.' 8 Furthermore, choosing unnecessarily expen-
sive cleanup methods depletes the fund so as to foreclose action at other
sites and may make impossible the compensation of those damaged by
harm incidental to cleanup action.19 Finally, because private parties (des-
ignated as "responsible parties" by the statute)2" are ultimately liable for
costs of Superfund cleanup actions, their rights to due process may be vio-
lated if agency choices regarding cleanup methods are reached without ad-
equate notice and opportunity to be heard.2' Thus, absent emergency
conditions at a particular site, the risks inherent in Superfund response
actions present a need for exactly the type of procedures mandated by
18. The EPA acknowledges that dangers are inherent in some cleanup actions: "Ex-
huming wastes from a landfill, for example, may create significant hazards for workers and
others who are nearby and may be exposed to wastes." 47 Fed. Reg. 32,315 (1982). The
possibility exists that the very action to line [e.g., with a clay liner to retard leaching of
wastes] a hazardous landfill or exhume the contaminated soil may itself be "dangerous or
impracticable." Id See infra notes 202-03 and accompanying text; cf. Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d at 375 (measures to enforce clean air standard could result in
harmful increase in water pollution). For full discussion of Portland Cement, see infra notes
76-95 and accompanying text.
19. See Liability for Claims Against Contractors under Superfund Limited to A ailable
Funds, [1982 Transfer Binder] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 849 (Oct. 22, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Liabilityfor Claims]. Any damage to the persons or businesses of third parties resulting from
the cleanup itself may not be fully compensable. See also infra notes 214-16 and accompa-
nying text. Money from Superfund should be expended carefully, to permit cleanup of more
sites. The NCP mandates cost-consciousness for all three types of cleanup actions. Even for
removal actions, immediate action must terminate after $1 million has been obligated for the
action or six months has elapsed since the action was initiated, unless a continued emer-
gency has been established. 40 C.F.R. § 300.65(d) (1983). For planned removal, the initial
criterion is that substantial cost savings will result by continuing cleanup response action
with equipment and resources already mobilized for an immediate removal action. 40
C.F.R. § 300.67(a)(1) (1983). For remedial actions, the agency must use the "lowest cost
alternative that is technologically feasible and reliable and which effectively mitigates and
minimizes damage to and provides adequate protection of public health, welfare, or the
environment." 40 C.F.R. § 300.680) (1983). The agency is to consider the amount of money
available in the Superfund for response at other sites. 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(k) (1983).
20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
21. The right to due process in such circumstances has been long established. See
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). In Londoner, a Colorado statute empowered the
Denver board of public works to pave the city streets and tax abutting landowners for the
costs. The tax was apportioned to each landowner according to the extent his property
fronted on the improved street. The United States Supreme Court held that, where an as-
sessment affected only specific individuals, they had right to notice and opportunity to be
heard before an obligation became irrevocably fixed. Id at 385-86. See also Seacoast Anti-
Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 876 (1st Cir. 1978) (formal hearing required to
protect rights of citizens at specific site when effects of agency's action potentially might
deplete shellfish, fish and wildlife at the site); K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE,
§ 7.2 (2d ed. 1979) (enforcement affecting specific individuals is "adjudicatory" in nature,
triggering due process right to notice and opportunity to be heard before the agency takes
significant action).
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NEPA.22
Left to its discretion, the EPA apparently plans to offer only minimal
opportunity for comment within each cleanup locality, and does not interd
to publish notice in the Federal Register inviting comment when planning
for each site is initiated.23 Meetings may be held at some sites, but are
designed primarily to notify citizens what to expect shortly before, for in-
stance, the bulldozers rumble onto the site. Plans will become available
for public inspection only after they are virtually complete, beyond the
point when comments could bring about meaningful adjustment.2 4
Congress has never explicitly imposed the full-fledged EIS requirement
across the board on EPA actions. Nor has Congress provided a blanket
exemption for the EPA.25 Where, as in the Superfund legislation, Con-
22. See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (1983); see also infra notes 198-213 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text. For the EPA's statement of its cur-
rent policy, see draft of chapter on Community Relations Policy from Guidance for Imple-
menting the Superfund Program, pt. III, sec. 4 (May 1983) (unpublished EPA material
available from BNA) [hereinafter cited as Community Relations Policy].
24. Community Relations Policy, supra note 23, at 3-4. Once a site has been identified
for remedial action, plans proceed in several stages: (1) development of alternatives; (2)
initial screening of alternatives on the basis of costs, effects and engineering feasibility of
each alternative; (3) detailed analysis after initial screening has eliminated undesirable alter-
natives; and (4) final selection of most appropriate alternative. 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(g)-(j)
(1983). The EPA indicates, however, that "[in the case of simple remedial measures, such
as fencing, storing drums, site security, etc., the public should be informed through the pub-
lic meeting on the RAMP [the Remedial Action Master Plan, which focuses on overall ac-
tion at the site]." Community Relations Policy, supra note 23, at 3-4. It is not clear whether
the notification of the community at the RAMP meeting is intended to substitute for an
opportunity to inspect the plan and comment on it or is in addition to that opportunity. The
EPA indicates that the community should have a three-week period to comment before a
final alternative is chosen, but then states that some steps toward cleanup may proceed prior
to completion of a full feasibility study. Id. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(e)(1) (1983) (provision
of NCP that would permit initial remedial measures to begin before final selection of appro-
priate remedial action). Factors permitting such initial actions, however, are threats so im-
minent and serious that removal action arguably is indicated. 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(e)(l)(i)-
(vii) (1983) (factors include, e.g., serious threat of fire or explosion and contaminated water
at the drinking tap). See infra notes 204-07; see also Jones, Hazardous Waste Cleanup, a
Special Report, 21 CH2M HILL REPORTS 5-6 (1983) (contractor hired by EPA to carry out
remedial action at 85 sites indicates community participation program consists primarily of
notifying public of actions as they are to be implemented).
25. Some statutes specifically relieve the EPA of any EIS obligation, implying that the
obligation otherwise exists. See infra note 96 and accompanying text (Amendment to the
Clean Air Act relieves the EPA of obligations under NEPA). Other statutes specifically
impose the EIS requirement on the EPA, implying that the EPA is generally exempt. See
infra notes 115, 135-36 and accompanying text (Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act specifically impose NEPA obligations on the EPA for implementation of the
Act). Polar positions are revealed in the early NEPA cases involving the EPA. Compare
Anaconda Copper Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 4 E.R.C. 1817, 1828 (D. Col. 1972) (cited in Portland
Cement, 486 F.2d at 379) (all federal agencies must file an impact statement; as EPA is a
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Superfund
gress has been silent regarding exactly how NEPA applies, 26 some courts
have required the EPA to provide opportunities for public participation
that are functionally equivalent to NEPA's EIS requirement.27
Functional equivalence is based upon a court's determination that some-
thing akin to, but short of, a full-fledged EIS fulfills the EPA's obligations
under NEPA as the agency acts to effectuate a particular environmental
statute. 28 Functional equivalence analysis is two-tiered. First, the court
considers the urgency of the situation the agency is addressing, and the
extent to which its enabling statute and the accompanying regulations
themselves require consideration of NEPA's core concerns.29 Second, it
considers the record to see whether, under all the circumstances, there was
sufficient opportunity for the public and affected parties to comment, and
whether that information was considered by the agency.3° Courts appear
willing to allow more minimal participation procedures where an emer-
gency requires quick EPA action.3'
Underlying the doctrine of functional equivalence are two competing,
crucial policy considerations. First, the goal of protecting the public's
health and safety makes it necessary for the EPA to move quickly and
avoid the sometimes excruciating delay that attends EIS procedures.32
federal agency, it must file an impact statement) with Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d
162 (6th Cir. 1973) (ludicrous to require EPA to file an impact statement with itself).
26. See, e.g., discussion by Portland Cement court, infra notes 78-89 and accompanying
text; see also infra note 27. Congress is aware that courts generally hold the EPA to some
form of NEPA compliance. In an amendment to the Clean Air Act, enacted during the
energy crisis created by the Arab oil embargo, Congress created a total exemption from
NEPA for EPA's actions under the Act. Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 7, June 22, 1974, 88 Stat. 259
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 793 (1982)). The highly specific nature of the exemption implies
that, in general, Congress does intend that the EPA be bound by NEPA. See infra note 96.
27. Functional equivalence has been extended to the EPA for implementation of the
Clean Air Act (in Portland Cement, discussed infra notes 75-95 and accompanying text); the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. EPA, discussed infra note 97); the Ocean Dumping Act of 1972 (in Maryland v. Train,
discussed infra notes 110-118 and accompanying text); the Water Pollution Control Act (in
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, discussed infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text); and the
Toxic Substances Control Act (in Warren County v. North Carolina, discussed infra notes
119-31 and accompanying text).
28. See supra note 27.
29. See, e.g., Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 385, discussed infra note 85 and accompany-
ing text.
30. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1978), dis-
cussed infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
906 (1976), discussed infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
32. A full EIS for a large project takes about twelve months to prepare. See Forty Most
Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46
Fed. Reg. 18,037 (1981).
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Second, that same goal demands that the EPA consider adequately any
information that would prevent serious error in the agency's course of ac-
tion. To avoid needless harm to the environment, public comment is
essential.34
With the EPA poised to begin major implementation of Superfund, the
precise meaning of functional equivalence is at issue.35 An analysis of the
case law of functional equivalence, as applied to the EPA, reveals that
courts have balanced a perceived need for streamlined action in an emer-
gency with a recognition of the values inherent, when circumstances per-
mit, in more extensive procedures. Absent an emergency, courts have, in
each instance, scrutinized the record built by the EPA under its equivalent
procedures to look for reasoned decisionmaking, that is, for careful consid-
eration of responsible comments.36 The EPA's current policies for plan-
ning remedial actions appear inadequate to build such a record. 37 Thus,
for these Superfund actions, agency policies fall short of the requirements
of the functional equivalence standard.
This Comment will trace the development of the functional equivalence
standard for EPA compliance with NEPA and will show how the agency's
policies for planning remedial actions fail to meet that standard. It will
propose a public participation program that would carry out NEPA's goals
while still permitting expeditious relief. Part I will outline NEPA's under-
lying goals and the procedure designed to fulfill them-the EIS. Part II
will trace the case law of functional equivalence. Part III will examine
Superfund's provisions for remedial actions against the backdrop of func-
tional equivalence case law and will propose a four-point program to
achieve NEPA compliance. The Comment will conclude that, because ur-
gency is much reduced for remedial actions, the EPA should amend
Superfund's regulations to provide a more substantial opportunity for pub-
lic comment to meet the standard of functional equivalence.
I. THE EIS: MAKING THE ENVIRONMENT A PRIORITY
In enacting NEPA, Congress recognized the profound environmental
33. As the Portland Cement court pointed out, "[A] NEPA statement's procedures,
though burdensome, allow for needed input by other federal agencies and simultaneously
open up the decision-making [sic] process to scrutiny by the public." 486 F.2d at 384.
34. See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
35. See 48 Fed. Reg. 40, 658 (1983)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 300); see also Rus-
sakoff, EPA Adds 133 Toxic Dumps to Super/und Cleanup List, Wash. Post, Sept. 2, 1983, at
1-2, col. i
36. See Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 402; Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1024-25.
37. See supra notes 23-24.
[Vol. 33:863
Superfund
impact of federal agency decisionmaking3 8 Prior to NEPA, those deci-
sions had been based almost entirely on economic considerations.39 Con-
gress intended the federal government, under NEPA, to become a model
environmentalist sensitive to public desires and aspirations for a healthy
environment. 4°
NEPA's two policy goals are careful consideration of the environment
and meaningful opportunity for public participation in a federal action
having substantial environmental impact.4 ' The procedural device created
by NEPA to serve its goals is the environmental impact statement (EIS).
42
In preparing a preliminary EIS, a federal agency analyzes a proposed ac-
tion in light of the five core issues of NEPA's section 102(2)(C) and allows
that action to be scrutinized by the public, other agencies and Congress.43
Through this analysis, the planning agency must consider the long and
short-term benefits and adverse effects of its proposed action, plausible al-
ternatives and their likely effects, and the cost of each alternative." In its
final form, the EIS incorporates the agency's responses to the substantive
comments drawn forth by its draft EIS.45 The EIS is designed to ensure
that potential environmental problems are considered early in the deci-
38. See H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2751, 2753-54:
Your committee does not believe that a useful purpose would be served by a
recitation of the many environmental problems which confront us today. It is a
simple fact of life that policies of agencies of the Federal Government may and do
conflict; it is equally true that there are occasions where, without the benefit of
conflicting policies, these Government agencies may and do adopt courses that ap-
pear to conflict with the general public interest.
Id.
39. See Senate Report on NEPA, supra note 3; Jackson, supra note 3; see also Comment,
America's Changing Environment-Is NEPA a Changefor the Better, 40 FORDHAM L. REV.
897, 902 (1972).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982). See Jackson, supra note 3, at 1081-82:
The needs and aspirations of future generations make it our duty to build a
sound and operable foundation of national objectives for the management of our
resources and our environment. We hold those resources in trust for our children
and their children. The future of succeeding generations in this country will be
shaped by the choices we make. We must choose well, for they cannot escape the
counsequences of our choices.
Id
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982); 40 C.F.R. pt. 15 (1983). See supra note 6, and infra notes
52-62 and accompanying text.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982); 40 C.F.R. pt. 15 (1983).
43. See supra note 6. The CEQ regulations establish procedures designed to promote
public participation in agency decisionmaking. See discussion infra notes 49-62 and accom-
panying text.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v) (1982); see 40 C.F.R. pt. 15 (1983).
45. See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
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sionmaking process, before irrevocable commitments of resources have
been made.46
The importance of public participation is clear from the legislative his-
tory of NEPA.47 Congress sought, through NEPA, to maintain open lines
of communication between agencies and affected segments of society.48
Accordingly, Congress gave the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ),4 9 an executive advisory body created by NEPA, the responsibility
of implementing the directives of section 102 regarding content of an EIS
and provision of an opportunity for public participation in its prepara-
tion." The EIS was to provide a framework for an agency's planning and
its ultimate arrival at a decision.
5 '
The EIS process begins with a federal agency's preliminary assessment
of a proposed action's environmental impact.52 If this assessment results
in a finding of no substantial impact (that is, only insignificant impact), the
action is deemed outside NEPA, and no EIS is required.53 Should the
environmental assessment indicate, however, that the proposed action falls
within NEPA, an agency must begin the formal EIS process by publishing
in the Federal Register a notice of intent to prepare an EIS.54 In its draft
EIS, the agency must identify the purpose of and need for the project and
evaluate it in light of the five core issues of section 102(2)(C) of NEPA. 55
For at least forty-five days, the agency must circulate the draft EIS among
relevant federal, state and local environmental agencies, affected Indian
tribes, and the public. 6
46. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 1079.
47. See supra note 12 and infra notes 58-59.
48. See H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 2761.
49. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
50. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4344-4345 (1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.,
reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2771-73.
51. SeeH.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., repintedin 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. AD.
NEWs at 2772-73.
52. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c) (1983). The content of and procedures for an EIS are set forth
in precise detail in the CEQ regulations, found at 40 C.F.R. pt. 15 (1983).
53. Id at §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13. For a discussion of the environmental assessment and
criteria for NEPA compliance when the assessment results in a finding of no substantial
impact or a finding of irreconcilable conflict with the statute being implemented, see gener-
ally, Comment, Environmental Impact Statements.- Instrumentsfor Environmental Protection
or Endless Litigation4 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527 (1983). Courts have recognized that a
federal agency is exempt from complying with NEPA if compliance would result in a "clear
and unavoidable conflict" with the purpose or procedure of the agency's enabling statute.
Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 788 (1976).
54. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1508.22 (1983).
55. Id §§ 1502.9(a), 1502.13-1502.16.
56. Id. §§ 1503.1, 1506.10(c).
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The agency must then issue a final EIS after it has considered the com-
ments received on the draft version.57 Copies of the final EIS are filed
with the EPA, transmitted to agencies that commented on the draft, and
made available to the public.5" In its final EIS, the agency must respond to
comments submitted on the draft EIS and discuss responsible opposing
views that were considered inadequately in the draft.59 Before its ultimate
decision on the project, the agency must generally wait at least thirty days
after the EPA publishes notice of the final EIS in the Federal Register.6 °
That decision must be presented in a public record of decisionmaking ar-
ticulating the basis for the agency's choice, listing the alternatives consid-
ered, and identifying any necessary mitigating measures.6, Thus, the EIS
process sets out elaborate steps designed to fulfill NEPA's mandate for
careful consideration of the environment.
62
Exemptions set forth in the CEQ regulations, however, can relieve an
agency of its EIS obligations. One such exemption pertains to "emer-
gency" situations. Yet the regulations provide no definition of what con-
stitutes an emergency. 63 They merely provide that an agency acting in an
emergency must notify the CEQ of its determination that an emergency
exists, and work out appropriate alternatives to the EIS procedure.'
Despite the benefits flowing from preparation of an EIS and the specific-
57. Id. § 1502.9(b).
58. Id §§ 1502.19, 1506.6(f), 1506.9.
59. Id §§ 1502.9(b), 1503(4).
60. Id § 1506.10(b)(2).
61. Id § 1505.2.
62. See supra note 40. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706
(1982) establishes the minimal standard of reasonable and open decisionmaking for federal
agencies. NEPA builds upon the APA standards to focus on the environment, to provide
fuller opportunity for public participation and to expand standing for challenges to agency
action on environmental grounds. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-34 (1972)
(standing to complain of an agency's action requires that a party have suffered an injury
arguably within the zone of interests protected by the statute under which the plaintiff seeks
relief); Mobil Oil v. F.T.C., 430 F. Supp. 855, 861-62 & nn.6-7 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 562 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1977) (pleading environmental injury establishes standing
under NEPA).
63. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (1983). Courts have interpreted an emergency as a species of
irreconcilable conflict of an agency's enabling statute and NEPA. See infra note 64.
64. The duty imposed is to inform the CEQ that emergency action is required. The
emergency exemption has barred the application of NEPA where an agency could not possi-
bly adhere to the full EIS procedure and at the same time comply with a deadline for deci-
sionmaking or a directive for prompt action mandated by the agency's enabling statute. See,
e.g., Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981) (Fish and Wildlife Service
exempt from filing EIS for action under Endangered Species Act where prolonged EIS pro-
cedures might destroy fragile species); National Ass'n of Property Owners v. United States,
499 F. Supp. 1223, 1267-68 (D. Minn. 1980), affd sub nom. Minnesota ex rel. Alexander v.
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ity of the regulations governing its preparation, courts have viewed the EIS
requirement as somewhat elastic, depending on the particular agency and
circumstances under which it is acting.65 The flexibility may be justified in
situations where action is urgently needed because preparation of a full-
fledged EIS can take considerable time.6 6 Therefore, courts have balanced
the urgency of an action against the fullness of an agency's five-issue anal-
ysis and the opportunity it provided for public participation.67 Finally, an
agency's environmental expertise is weighed in the balance as a court con-
siders the adequacy of the agency's environmental analysis.68
Although case law is far from consistent, courts generally look for some
form of NEPA compliance in EPA actions, even when the agency's en-
abling statute does not impose explicit NEPA requirements. 69 Courts have
recognized the need for a less rigid standard, however, when the EPA is
involved.7" The EPA is considered entitled to greater deference because
the environmental concerns embodied in NEPA involve the kind of bal-
ancing that the EPA invariably must carry out in its role as environmental
overseer.7' The accommodation reached by the courts is embodied in the
Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) (EIS unnecessary
where EIS requirement would conflict with statutory deadline).
Besides meeting the requirements of NEPA, preparation of an EIS serves two additional
purposes. First, the detailed EIS procedure acts as a curb on arbitrary and capricious
agency action. Second, the procedure results in the agency's building a detailed record for
judicial review should the agency's action subsequently be challenged. See infra notes 88-89,
138-42 and accompanying text.
65. Compare Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d at 835 (direct conflict found
between NEPA and agency's enabling statute) with Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), aft'd, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 427
U.S. 913 (1976) (Bureau of Land Management required to file EIS to issue permits for live-
stock grazing on public land in 11 western states where no grave time constraint or other
direct conflict between NEPA and agency's enabling statute existed).
66. See Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Pol-
icy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,037 (198 1) (one year for preparation of EIS for major
project).
67. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C.
1978) (even in a possible emergency, agency required to provide fair opportunity for com-
ment), discussed infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
68. See Maryland v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 116, 122 (D. Md. 1976), discussed infra notes
110-18 and accompanying text.
69. Compare, e.g., Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 384-85 andWeyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle,
590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (court looked for environmental balancing and for proce-
dures that clearly accomplished purpose of an EIS) with Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66
(10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976), andMaryland v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 116
(D. Md. 1976) (rough approximation of EIS balancing and procedures adequate when ur-
gency is present). See infra notes 76-95, 98-109, 110-118, 134-42 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1051 n.66.
71. See id. at 1051 n.65; see also Train, 415 F. Supp. at 122.
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concept of functional equivalence, a judicially created doctrine holding
that substantial compliance by EPA with NEPA's requirements is an effec-
tive substitute for preparation of an EIS.72
II. FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE TO THE EIS REQUIREMENT
A. Origins of Functional Equivalence. Portland Cement
Functional equivalence is a determination by a court that a federal
agency has achieved the underlying purposes of NEPA by means parallel
to an EIS, where an EIS would, at least technically, be required.73 Courts
look for two factors in the agency's record: first, whether the agency has
fulfilled its substantive NEPA duty of balancing environmental costs
against benefits; and, second, whether the agency has employed public par-
ticipation procedures commensurate with the complexity of its proposed
action and within the time available for planning."4 While courts gener-
ally hold that functional equivalence satisfies the EPA's obligations under
NEPA, exactly what constitutes "equivalence" remains unclear. The stan-
dard differs depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. An
examination of the case law offers some insight into the balancing process
applied by the courts, and suggests an appropriate framework for func-
tional equivalence analysis for the three types of Superfund cleanup
actions.
The functional equivalence standard originated in cases involving EPA
enforcement of the Clean Air Act.75 In the leading case, Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,76 a trade association of cement manufacturers chal-
lenged the promulgation by the EPA of particulate emission standards for
new or modified cement plants.77 The association charged that the EPA's
Administrator violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS before promul-
gating the standards.78 Consequently, the EPA failed to consider ade-
quately both the economic costs of and the achievability of those
72. See Train, 415 F. Supp. at 122; see also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA,
489 F.2d 1247, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
73. See infra notes 75-97 and accompanying text.
74. Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1051 nn.65-67. See infra notes 134-42 and accompanying
text.
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-6, 1857c-6(b)(1) (1982).
76. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
77. Id. at 377-78. The agency was acting pursuant to § 111 of the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1982), to establish emission standards for stationary sources. Stationary
sources include, for instance, factory smokestacks, and exclude moving sources, such as ve-
hicle exhaust systems.
78. Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 379.
1984]
Catholic University Law Review
standards.79 The EPA contended that, as an environmental protection
agency, it was not subject to NEPA, and that even if it were, statutory time
constraints relieved it of any NEPA obligations.8"
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that EPA's public participation opportunity procedures under the
Clean Air Act must be "functionally equivalent" to a full-blown EIS.8
The court determined that the best solution would be to balance the need
for swift action against the need for full deliberation.82 The court's balanc-
ing resulted in its finding a narrow exception, functional equivalence, for
EPA's action in promulgating standards under the Clean Air Act.83 The
Pertland Cement court reasoned that functional equivalence struck a
"workable balance between some of the advantages and disadvantages of
full application of NEPA."84 Section 111 of the Clean Air Act, properly
construed, required consideration of the same factors as an EIS.85 The
EPA, using notice and comment rulemaking, had provided ample oppor-
tunity for public participation. Indeed, 200 interested parties had actually
commented.86 The EPA's Administrator had published an explanation of
how the agency had reached its conclusions concerning the particulate
emission standards.87 A record had thus been built for the court to scruti-
79. Id. The issues raised in Portland Cement were interrelated since economic analysis
is required by NEPA (id. at 387 n.49), and feasibility of standards is closely tied to the
second core issue of NEPA, adverse effects of the proposed plan. The association offered
some evidence that, under then-existing technology, air scrubbers would produce a harmful
level of water pollution as part of their operation. Under the technique of air scrubbing,
glass fabric bags would capture the harmful gas and particle mixture. The bags were cooled
by a water spray to avoid damage from the excessive heat of the smokestacks. The water
spray would sometimes combine with the dust to form a gummy residue, which had to be
continuously flushed out to keep the filter system operating properly. That flushing proce-
dure produced liquid purge waste, which caused water pollution. Id. at 384, 390-91. The
association argued that those adverse effects would have been addressed and opened to pub-
lic scrutiny by an EIS, and presumably would have altered the EPA's decision. Id at 384.
80. Id at 380-81.
81. Id. at 386, 402.
82. The court looked for evidence that the decision had been based on a consideration
of the relevant factors, and that there had been no clear error of judgment. Id at 394, 402.
83. Id at 387.
84. Id. at 386.
85. Id at 385.
86. Id at 378-79.
87. Id at 386. According to the Portland Cement court, functional equivalence offered
more flexibility than the impact statement, but required that the EPA's statement of reasons
and criteria be "a fuller presentation than the minimum rule-making requirement of the
Administrative Procedure Act." Id The minimum rulemaking requirement is that the Ad-
ministrator offer a specific explanation of how he arrived at a particular standard. Id. at 379,
386 (citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). Under func-
tional equivalence, the agency must make "appropriate reference" to significant adverse en-
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nize, thereby fulfilling an essential purpose of EIS procedure. 88 The court
studied that record, as it would an EIS, applying the Administrative Proce-
dure Act's (APA) criteria for reasoned decisionmaking.89
Writing for the court, Judge Leventhal surveyed the legislative history
and found it inconclusive regarding congressional intent to apply NEPA's
constraints to the EPA. 9° He discussed the concerns voiced by NEPA's
sponsor during congressional debate, and summarized them as "the en-
demic question of 'who shall police the police?' " Indeed, the EPA might
not always be the "good guys.'"92 Furthermore, the agency "might wear
blinders when promulgating standards protecting one resource as to effects
on other resources."93 Finally, statutory time constraints (limiting the Ad-
ministrator to 300 days for identification, development, and promulgation
of standards)94 suggested that abbreviated procedures might be appropri-
ate, but did not relieve the EPA of NEPA obligations.95
In subsequent Clean Air Act cases, several courts applied the Portland
Cement standard and found functional equivalence in procedures that
were similar to those employed in Portland Cement.96 Moreover, shortly
vironmental consequences of its proposal along with its reasons justifying that proposal. 486
F.2d at 386. The agency thus highlights its underlying balancing analysis to elicit comments
from the public and Congress, and to permit scrutiny by the courts to assure "that a rea-
soned decision has been reached." Id at 386 & n.44.
88. 486 F.2d at 386. Fearing that NEPA challenges could be used as a litigation tactic
of delay when circumstances required the EPA to act expeditiously, the court saw no point
in ordering the EPA to repeat procedures, under the label of "EIS," which had already
achieved NEPA's ends. Id at 384. Furthermore, the agency was required to consider only
those comments potentially significant enough "to step over a threshold of materiality." Id
at 394.
89. Id. at 402. The action was remanded to the agency for further consideration and
clarification because the record revealed a lack of adequate opportunity for the cement man-
ufacturers to comment on the proposed standards. The standard by which the record, built
through functionally equivalent procedures, was judged was the administrative law standard
articulated in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (whether
"the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment").
90. 486 F.2d at 381-85.
91. Id. at 384. Sen. Henry Jackson of Washington sponsored NEPA.
92. Id
93. Id.
94. The effective date of the Clean Air Act was Dec. 31, 1970. Ninety days thereafter,
the Administrator was required to publish a list of categories of stationary sources which
contributed significantly to air pollution; 120 days thereafter, he was required to propose
standards; and 90 days thereafter, the standards were to go into effect. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-
6(b)(I) (1982). See Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 380.
95. 486 F.2d at 381.
96. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)
(120-day comment period, with public hearings in Washington, D.C., Dallas, and Los Ange-
les; court required to engage in searching and substantial inquiry into facts, particularly in
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after Portland Cement, federal courts began applying the functional equiv-
alence standard to EPA actions under other environmental statutes.97
Some courts were reluctant to impose the standard, however, where the
EPA had demonstrated a need for emergency action.
B. Functional Equivalence and Emergencies
In Wyoming v. Hathaway,98 decided three years after Portland Cement,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered the
functional equivalence standard in the context of a NEPA challenge to
EPA deregistration of three substances under the Federal Insecticide, Fun-
gicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).99 In Hathaway, the substances in
question were chemical toxicants used by sheep herders for coyote con-
trol. " At issue was whether an emergency existed: evidence showed that
endangered wildlife had perished from indiscriminate baiting with the tox-
icants.' Finding an imminent threat of irremediable loss of threatened
highly technical cases); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974) (two days
of public hearings held in mid-comment period; court closely analyzed evidence relied upon
by agency in holding that EPA had committed no clear error of judgment in computing
need for emission reductions); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (public
hearings held in three cities; court extensively analyzed agency's findings to conclude that
reasoning was sound); Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974) (over 200 comments considered; record remanded because
agency had insufficiently considered damage to water from waste produced by air scrub-
bers).
In 1974 Congress amended the Clean Air Act to exempt EPA's actions under that Act
from NEPA. The amendment provides that such actions are not to be deemed "major Fed-
eral Action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969." Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 7, June 22, 1974,
88 Stat. 259 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 793 (1982)). Responding to the energy crisis created by
the Arab oil embargo, Congress was seeking to facilitate industrial conversion to coal, favor-
ing economic factors, at least temporarily, over environmental concerns. H.R. REP. No.
1013, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3281. The
limited nature of the exemption arguably affirms the Portland Cement court's determination
that Congress intended that the EPA generally comply with NEPA.
97. The same year as Portland Cement, functional equivalence was extended to EPA
action under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136(a)-(y) (1982). See Enviromental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (court applied Portland Cement analysis in upholding EPA action banning DDT
for most uses).
98. 525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976).
99. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(a)-(y) (1982). Deregistration is, essentially, the banning of a
substance.
100. 525 F.2d at 67.
101. Id. at 68. The court spoke of "grave concern" over the reported deaths of twenty
eagles who had consumed bait intended for coyotes. Other endangered species threatened
by the poisons were bald and golden eagles, California condors, black-footed ferrets, moun-
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wildlife, the EPA had acted immediately to ban the three substances.10 2
The district court granted an injunction permitting continued use of the
substances, finding that the EPA violated NEPA by neither filing an EIS
nor providing its functional equivalent prior to deregistration. 0 3 On ap-
peal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that under the urgent circum-
stances, the EPA's procedures satisfied its NEPA obligations. 10 4 The
Hathaway court determined that EPA's procedures had been functionally
equivalent to the preparation of an EIS. °5 In its functional equivalence
analysis, the court implied that a rigorous consideration of all five core
NEPA issues may not have been essential.' 6 The EPA had, in fact, based
its deregistration order on a single study, the Cain Committee Report."7
The court noted that because the Cain Committee Report (commissioned
by the CEQ and the Department of the Interior) contained some environ-
mental balancing and discussion of alternatives, it constituted the func-
tional equivalent of an EIS." 8
The Hathaway court softened the hard look of the Clean Air Act cases to
tain lions, grizzly bears, Rocky Mountain and red wolves. The court viewed diminution of
these species as immediate and irreparable harm. Id at 69.
102. The Hathaway court noted that "[e]ach death to that population [of endangered
species] is an irremediable loss and renders such species closer to extinction." Id at 68 n.2.
The court thus appears to be applying the direct conflict doctrine, which relieves an agency
of NEPA obligations. See Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, discussed supra
note 64; see also Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic River Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 788 (1976) (fed-
eral agency is exempt from complying with NEPA if compliance would result in a "clear
and unavoidable conflict" with the purpose or procedure of the agency's enabling statute).
Wildlife conservation, while the immediate responsibility of the Fish and Wildlife Service, is
closely intertwined with the EPA's concerns. See Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1051-52 (EPA
has responsibility to consider effects of its actions upon wildlife).
103. 525 F.2d at 67.
104. Id at 68-69.
105. Id. at 71.
106. Id. at 72.
107. Id at 69. The Cain Committee Report was issued by the Advisory Committee on
Predator Control at the University of Michigan.
108. Id. As a sharp dissent pointed out, however, the Cain Committee Report purported
only to present one side, the conservation viewpoint. Id at 73-74 (Seth, J., dissenting). Fur-
thermore, the right to a hearing, provided in FIFRA, was available only to a registrant. In
Wyoming, the sole registrant for use of the deregistered substances was a federal agency, the
Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife. Thus the state and its stockgrowers, who merely
benefitted from the Bureau's use of the substances on their behalf, had no standing to seek a
hearing. The opportunity to comment on an EIS or its equivalent was their only means of
placing their concerns before the EPA. The Cain Committee's refusal to include the oppos-
ing views in its Report, according to the dissent, rendered that study inadequate to serve a
major purpose of NEPA, the provision of fair opportunity for all sides to be heard. Id at
73-74. Moreover, a clear caveat in the Cain Committee Report indicated that its data was
not drawn from carefully designed research directed to the pertinent question of harm to
wildlife balanced against economic benefit to herders. Id. at 73-74.
1984]
Catholic University Law Review
a deferential complaisance. Although Portland Cements functional equiv-
alence standard was not met, Hathaway s outcome can be justified on the
basis of an existing emergency.' 0 9 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit failed to
develop adequately the emergency ground.
In Maryland v. Train,"' the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland found functional equivalence in public participation proce-
dures instituted under the Ocean Dumping Act of 1972." The EPA,
without preparing an EIS, extended the sewage sludge dumping permit it
had granted to Camden, New Jersey." 2 Maryland, fearing pollution of its
ocean beaches, raised a NEPA challenge to EPA's action." 3
Considering several factors, the court held that functional equivalence
met NEPA's requirements." I4 First, the Ocean Dumping Act contained no
language specifically requiring EPA's compliance with NEPA. 5 Second,
the exigent circumstances mandated swift action by the EPA. Without the
dumping permit, Camden would have to dump its accumulated sludge in
the Delaware River, thereby creating immediate health hazards to those
living along the river." 6 Third, the expertise of the EPA substituted for
formal adherence to NEPA's five core issue analysis.' '7 Finally, the court
considered hearings held pursuant to the granting of previous dumping
permits to Camden an opportunity for public comment adequate to satisfy
NEPA's goals." 8 Train thus perpetuated Hathawajs pattern of deference
to the EPA when the agency persuades the court that an emergency exists.
The presence of an emergency also explains two recent decisions by the
United States District Court for the District of North Carolina that effec-
109. Id at 68-69.
110. 415 F. Supp. 116 (D. Md. 1976).
111. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1982).
112. 415 F. Supp. at 122.
113. Id at 121.
114. Id
115. Id. at 122. The court found significant the fact that Congress specifically provided
that the EPA must comply with NEPA in similar legislation, the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972. See 33 U.S.C. § 137 1(c) (1982). The absence of such
language in the Ocean Dumping Act, the Train court indicated, raised a presumption that
the EPA was exempt from filing an EIS under that Act. 415 F. Supp. at 122. The court
evidently interpreted the doctrine of functional equivalence as placing an agency's action
outside NEPA, rather than offering an alternative means of NEPA compliance.
116. Id at 122, 124.
117. Id at 122.
118. Id. at 119-20, 123. The EPA had conducted two public hearings before issuance of
two earlier permits to Camden. The Train court held that the EPA was required to hold a
hearing on the renewal of Camden's sludge dumping permit because the Ocean Dumping




tively weakened the functional equivalence standard developed in Port-
land Cement. These cases, Warren County v. North Carolina"9 and Twitty
v. North Carolina2 ' arose from the discovery of waste containing
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a highly carcinogenic substance, along
miles of North Carolina's roadsides. 2 ' To eliminate the danger presented,
the state planned to remove the PCB-saturated soil and deposit it in a
landfill in Warren County.'22 The county and private parties who were
adjoining landowners filed suits against North Carolina and the EPA to
enjoin use of the site. A NEPA challenge was raised in both suits.
123
In both cases the district court held that functional equivalence satisfied
EPA's obligation under NEPA, thus relieving the agency of any duty to
prepare a site-specific EIS.' 24 The Warren County court adopted a two-
pronged test: first, whether there was a fair and adequate opportunity for
public participation in the decisionmaking; and second, whether EPA con-
sidered all matters brought to its attention before making a final deci-
sion.' 25  Applying this test, the court concluded that functional
equivalence was met in both Warren County and Twitty.
In each case the district court found that there had been a fair and ade-
quate opportunity for public participation, thus satisfying the first prong.
North Carolina had prepared an EIS in accord with the state's environ-
mental protection act, which was nearly identical to NEPA. 126 Warren
County and private citizens had commented extensively, and the state had
responded to those comments. 27 In addition to adopting the state's com-
prehensive EIS, the EPA had held a hearing to consider citizen
complaints. '28
Furthermore, the record indicated that EPA's procedures met the court's
second prong for functional equivalence. Pursuant to its responsibilities
under the Toxic Substances Control Act, the EPA had reviewed North
119. 528 F. Supp. 276 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
120. 527 F. Supp. 778 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
121. Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 281 & n.9. Disposal of PCBs is regulated by the
EPA under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2612, 2618-2619, 2619(a)
(1982).
122. Both Twitty and Warren County were decided by Judge Brit on Nov. 25, 1981. Both
cases arose from the same set of facts. Twitty, 527 F. Supp. at 780-81; Warren County, 528 F.
Supp. at 280-81.
123. Twitty, 527 F. Supp. at 780; Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 280.
124. Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 286-87; Twitty, 527 F. Supp. at 783.
125. Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 287.
126. Id. at 284, 290-91. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-1 to 113A-4 (1978).
127. Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 290-96. The court reviewed in detail both the con-
tentions of the plaintiffs and the response of the state environmental agency.
128. Id at 287. It is not clear at what stage of planning the hearing was held.
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Carolina's EIS.' 2 9 The EIS specified the manner in which the landfill
would comply with Toxic Substances Control Act regulations. Respond-
ing to concerns raised in the comments, the EPA had required that the
plan proposed in the state EIS be modified to conform more precisely with
federal regulations.' 30 Under the urgent conditions present in the case-
the continued presence of the PCBs along the roadways-the court found
that the EPA's use of the state-prepared EIS met the functional equiva-
lence standard. '
3
The "emergency" line of cases-Hathaway, Train, Warren County, and
Twitty-appear to have stamped functional equivalence as an imprimatur
on whatever environmental balancing and procedures had been provided
by the EPA. In each case, however, the urgency of the situation required
the agency to exercise broad discretion, arguably consistent with the emer-
gency exemption built into the CEQ regulations. 32 In other functional
equivalence cases where the urgency element was absent or less compel-
ling, courts have adopted the thorough analysis of Portland Cement and
scrutinized the EPA's procedures more closely.
C. The Evolution of the Portland Cement Standard
More recent cases have helped develop the contours of the Portland Ce-
ment standard. In these cases, courts have found functional equivalence
only where the agency had (1) balanced environmental costs and benefits;
(2) fairly provided for public participation at a meaningful time in the
decisionmaking process; and (3) considered any substantive comments
elicited. 133
In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, '4 the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit considered a NEPA challenge to EPA's
use of notice and comment rulemaking to set new industrial effluent stan-
dards under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 135 The EPA, de-
spite a provision of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments that
could be construed as imposing that obligation, failed to file an EIS.
136
The court made an initial determination that, under the statute, functional
129. Id at 293-94.
130. Id at 293-96.
131. Id. at 287; Twitty, 527 F. Supp. at 783. The court emphasized the urgency of the
situation, at one point asking rhetorically, "What, then, [if no county would accept it] would
North Carolina do with the PCB laced soil?" Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 290.
132. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 76-97 and accompanying text.
134. 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
135. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
136. 590 F.2d at 1051 & n.65. See 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c) (1982).
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equivalence would satisfy NEPA's requirements. 137 The court then speci-
fied its criteria for functional equivalence. The criteria, drawn from the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), required: (1) an explanation of the
facts and policies relied on by the agency in making its decision; (2) some
basis for those facts apparent in the record; (3) a basis for concluding that
the facts and legislative concerns could lead a reasonable person to make
the judgment that the agency made; and (4) that degree of openness, expla-
nation, and participatory democracy required under sound administrative
law. 138
Although the EPA was relieved of its obligation to prepare a full EIS,
the record built through functional equivalence had to pass muster under
the court's four criteria. Under this analysis, the court found that the
EPA's procedures were inadequate to justify their setting one of three ef-
fluent standards. 139 Procedures were found unsound because the industry
was not provided an opportunity to comment on cost calculations based on
meager data, used by the EPA to support the standard. 4 ' The Weyerhaeu-
ser court thus espoused the view that functional equivalence must serve
sound administrative law purposes by meeting the three goals set forth in
Portland Cement. The agency must have balanced environmental costs
and benefits, provided a meaningful opportunity for public participation,
and considered any substantive comments elicited. 141 Where a component
of the agency's action fell short of those goals, the standard of functional
equivalence was not met.
142
Immediately following Weyerhaeuser, in Environmental Defense Fund,
137. 590 F.2d at 1051-52 & n.66.
138. Id. at 1027-28. The court applied its criteria to the record built under the function-
ally equivalent procedures.
139. Id at 1028.
140. Id. at 1029-30.
141. Id at 1030-31. The court indicated that the EPA's duties under NEPA are more
attenuated than those of any other agency, based on the willingness of Congress and the
courts to place some trust in the EPA's commitment to the environment. Id at 1051 nn.65-
66. Nevertheless, the court declared that those affected must be accorded "their procedural
due" through an opportunity to participate in the agency's choice of action. Id at 1024. The
Weyerhaeuser standard continues to be applied to the EPA. See Small Ref. Lead Phase-
Down Task Force v. U.S.E.P.A., 705 F.2d 506, 549-50 (D.C. Cir. 1983), where the court,
citing Weyerhaueser, held that the agency's notice to the public must fairly apprise interested
parties of the issue involved. Notice must not demand an elaborate "treasure hunt," but
should make important data easily accessible to interested parties. Careful consideration of
comments received permits the "EPA to get its facts straight." 705 F.2d at 549-50.
142. As in Portland Cement, the Weyerhaeuser court scrutinized the record built under
functional equivalence and pinpointed an area where procedures had been deficient and
where the agency's decision was questionable. 590 F.2d 1028-30. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
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Inc. v. Blum 143 the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia applied the functional equivalence standard as expanded in Weyer-
haeuser. Blum arose from the EPA's approval, without an EIS filing, of a
new pesticide, Ferriamicide, to control fire ants in Mississippi.'" The
agency contended that its action was functionally equivalent under emer-
gency conditions, based on danger to humans from the severe, occasionally
fatal reaction to the ant's sting.'45 The EPA, however, took seven months
to consider extensive comment.146 Therefore, the court reasoned, the EPA
could not claim that an emergency justified its failure to publicize suffi-
ciently its planning stage, and to make available for public scrutiny the ex
parte comments upon which it had relied.'47 The agency's flawed proce-
dures, the court found, had deprived the Environmental Defense Fund of
the opportunity to offer timely comments for the agency to consider it in its
final order.1
48
The court, accordingly, strictly scrutinized the record produced against
the Weyerhaeuser functional equivalence standard. 49 The agency had
balanced environmental costs and benefits to meet the standard's first com-
ponent: all five core NEPA issues had been considered, perhaps somewhat
perfunctorily.' 5 However, by giving inadequate notice of its planned ac-
tion and by relying on exparte comments, the EPA had not provided op-
portunity for fair and meaningful public participation or considered all
substantive comments, thereby failing to meet the standard's second and
third components.' As in Weyerhaeuser, the Blum court ultimately ex-
amined the record under administrative law criteria to determine whether
there had been the requisite open and reasoned decisionmaking.' 52 While
143. 458 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C. 1978).
144. Id. at 661.
145. Id at 656, 659.
146. Id at 661.
147. Id. at 656, 662-63.
148. Id. at 657, 659-61. Mississippi had requested that use of Ferriamicide be permitted
on schoolyards, playgrounds and river embankments (levees), as well as agricultural fields.
As the plaintiff pointed out, the EPA had approved the request without considering the
potential risk such use would create for children, women of childbearing age, and others
who unwittingly came in contact with treated ground. Id at 660-61.
149. The Blum court quoted Weyerhaeuse~s language calling for deference to the EPA's
judgment in environmental matters when Congress has required it to act quickly and deci-
sively. Id at 657 (citing Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1026). The Blum court indicated that the
agency's record, built under functional equivalence, must be scrutinized for all three indicia
of sound environmental decisionmaking. Id. at 657 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416-17).
150. Blum, 458 F. Supp. at 661-62.
151. Id. at 659-61.
152. Id. at 663.
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the need for streamlined procedures absolved the agency from the full EIS
requirement, it nonetheless was required to provide an adequate opportu-
nity for public participation and to address all substantive comments in its
final order.' 53
Under the case law as applied to the EPA, functional equivalence has
merged with administrative law criteria. The courts show deference to
EPA's environmental expertise, presuming that the agency's analysis pre-
paratory to an action accomplishes the balancing mandated by NEPA's
five core issues. 154 Absent an emergency, however, the agency must follow
procedures that offer an opportunity for public participation analogous to
that provided under EIS procedures. That is, the agency's proposed action
must be publicized sufficiently to elicit comments early enough in the plan-
ning stage to help shape the ultimate decision. 1' Furthermore, the record
must reveal that the EPA responded adequately to comments raising sub-
stantial concerns. 56 Functional equivalence, therefore, is sound adminis-
trative law with an environmental fulcrum.
57
Two federal courts of appeals have applied functional equivalence anal-
ysis to actions of another agency, the Forest Service. In Texas Committee
on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 58 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, citing Portland Cement, applied functional equiva-
lence to the Forest Service's promulgation of interim guidelines for
clearcutting in Texas forests.'" The guidelines set temporary criteria for
the harvesting of trees, applicable until an overall plan could be estab-
lished pursuant to the National Forest Management Act (NFMA).
160
NFMA provides that regulations promulgated under it must comply with
NEPA. 16 ' Nevertheless, the Forest Service did not prepare a program-
matic EIS for actions under the interim guidelines.
62
153. Some streamlining of procedures is permissible. Id at 662 n.6. But the agency must
offer fair notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Id. at 663-64.
154. See supra notes 85, 106, 117 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 79, 140, 148 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 88, 148 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 89, 138, 149 and accompanying text.
158. 573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978).
159. Id at 207, 211.
160. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614 (1982). The section on clearcutting is found at § 1604(g).
161. 573 F.2d at 207-08. The NFMA provides that the Forest Service must prepare its
major program for forest management in compliance with NEPA. 16 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982).
The Forest Service had been given two years from the date of passage of the NFMA to
prepare the overall plan. At issue in Texas Committee was the Forest Service's application
of congressional guidelines for the interim period. 573 F.2d at 207-08.
162. 573 F.2d at 204. The Texas Committee court construed the legislative history of the
interim clearcutting guidelines to indicate that an EIS would be required only if new Forest
Service regulations differed significantly from existing regulations. Id
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The Texas Committee court held that, under the circumstances, func-
tional equivalence relieved the Forest Service of its EIS obligation.'6 3 In
deciding to permit clearcutting under the interim guidelines, Congress did
the cost-benefit balancing requisite under NEPA's five core issue analy-
sis. 16 4 Furthermore, Forest Service procedures paralleled NEPA's public
participation component: the agency publicized its specific application of
the guidelines and considered comments at meetings held throughout the
state, where environmentalists and the lumber industry were equally rep-
resented. 65 The record indicated that the Forest Service considered com-
ments elicited in shaping its final plans for lumber harvesting at particular
sites. 16 6 Thus, the agency produced a record which passed muster under
NEPA.
167
In California v. Block,168 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit applied functional equivalence analysis to the Forest Serv-
ice's designations of forest land in California as wilderness, further plan-
ning, or nonwilderness areas.169 The Forest Service, acting under NFMA,
was required to comply with NEPA. 17 ' No urgency element was pres-
ent.17 ' The Forest Service had prepared an EIS for the overall program,
and argued that the programmatic EIS was the functional equivalent of a
site-specific EIS for each wilderness area.7 2 The Block court held that the
programmatic EIS was not functionally equivalent because it did not pro-
163. Id at 208. The court indicated that it would not ordinarily apply functional equiva-
lence to the Forest Service, because its role was economic, as well as environmentally protec-
tive. Id Yet the tight constraints upon the agency's discretion (see supra note 162) and the
procedures it provided did comply with NEPA. 573 F.2d at 211.
164. Congress chose to permit clearcutting under the interim guidelines. Id. at 208, 211.
Clearcutting involves harvesting all the timber within a designated area in one cut. All trees
in the area are leveled within inches of the ground, and the area is prepared for natural
regeneration, artificial seeding, or planting of nursery-grown trees. Plaintiffs favored selec-
tive cutting, that is, the harvesting of selected trees of only a certain age. Id. at 205.
165. The Forest Service prepared an arguably flawed EIS for one area, the Conroe Unit
of Sam Houston National Forest. Id at 204. In preparing that EIS, the Forest Service held
"charettes," small group public discussions, in compliance with the NFMA. Id at 211 n.9.
166. Id at 211.
167. Id.
168. 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
169. Id. at 757. The Forest Service planned to allocate all roadless areas within the Na-
tional Forest System into three categories. "Wilderness" areas were to be left in their primi-
tive state. "Further Planning" areas were to be protected pending completion of site-specific
plans which would consider whether to recommend that the area be left undeveloped.
"Nonwilderness" areas were to be opened for potential development. Id. at 758.
170. Id at 757-58 n.2. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
171. The Forest Service and the Block court both recognized that the project was "pro-
tracted." 690 F.2d at 768.
172. Id at 760-62.
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vide adequate opportunity for comment regarding the particular interests
to be weighed at each site.' 73 Any site designated as nonwilderness, thus
permitting development, probably could never be reclaimed as wilderness.
Affected citizens, therefore, had a statutory right under NEPA to partici-
pate in agency deliberations regarding each site. 1
74
Although not involving the EPA, Block applies to the EPA to the extent
that it is a reaffirmation of the stewardship principle articulated in the leg-
islative history of NEPA: absent an emergency, that statute guarantees the
right of the public to participate meaningfully in decisions affecting the
environment. 75 According to the Block court, the exact extent of the pub-
lic participation opportunity needed to satisfy NEPA varies with the ur-
gency of the action.' 76 Under functional equivalence, the courts have
balanced the need for expeditious action with the need for full deliberation
and public participation to reduce agency error and to increase public con-
fidence in agency choices. For EPA's response actions under Superfund,
the same underlying values compete. Block reemphasized NEPA's man-
date of early, meaningful public participation in site-specific agency plan-
ning. The issue under Superfund is what, under the circumstances of each
of the three types of cleanup actions, is adequate environmental analysis
and adequate opportunity for comment to meet the functional equivalence
criteria of reasonableness and fairness.
III. REMEDIAL ACTIONS UNDER SUPERFUND: THE MEASURE OF
EQUIVALENCE
A. Cleanup Actions Under Superfund
Superfund is a comprehensive body of legislation intended to improve
and protect the environment from the release of hazardous wastes.' 77 The
173. Id. at 773-75 (citing Texas Comm., 573 F.2d at 211). A programmatic EIS sets forth
national planning alternatives and criteria. In Block, the agency solicited comment concern-
ing its overall decisional criteria, the land allocations that resulted from its proposed alterna-
tives, and possible alternatives not considered in the draft. Over 264,000 comments were
submitted. Id. at 758. The court nevertheless held that a site-specific EIS was required
before any area could be designated as nonwilderness. A site-specific EIS focuses on the
exact area to be affected, identifying the unique attributes of the area and permitting those
most affected to comment meaningfully "prior to the first significant point of decision in the
agency review process." Id at 770.
174. Id. at 773.
175. Id. at 772.
176. Id. at 765, 774-75. The magnitude of the task of preparing a site-specific EIS for
each area does not create an exemption from NEPA, as would a direct statutory conflict. Id
at 775 (citing Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v, Scenic River Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 788 (1976)).
177. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). Superfund establishes the Hazardous Substances
Response Fund, which may be used by the EPA to effect cleanup of inactive sites. 42 U.S.C.
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statute authorizes cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste sites, while its
companion statute, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA),'78 regulates current and future disposal of hazardous waste at
operating waste disposal sites. Superfund and the National Contingency
Plan (NCP) establish an extensive reporting and investigative system
through which abandoned waste sites may be identified.' 79 Once identi-
fied, a site is evaluated by the EPA to determine its priority for cleanup,
depending on the danger of release of hazardous waste into the environ-
ment. Accordingly, the agency classifies a site for one of three types of
cleanup action-removal, planned removal, or remedial action.'
80
Based on that classification, the EPA initiates site-specific planning in
accord with the NCP.' 8 ' Superfund requires only that the response not be
inconsistent with the NCP.'82 Because the response is a federal action
having significant impact on the environment, NEPA, as the EPA ac-
knowledges, also applies.' 83 The question remaining is the manner in
which NEPA must be incorporated in Superfund response planning. In
short, the issue is whether a court will stamp its imprimatur on whatever
the EPA has done and label it functional equivalence, or engage in a bal-
ancing process to determine what is equivalent under all the
circumstances.
§ 9641 (1982). When the EPA has itself effected cleanup, drawing upon the trust fund, those
designated as responsible parties by § 107(a) of Superfund are liable, and must reimburse
the trust fund. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
178. The Resources Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 90 Stat.
2807, amended by Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6987 and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1982)).
179. The NCP contains provisions for discovery of abandoned hazardous waste disposal
sites and notification of the EPA of their location, followed by a preliminary assessment of
the hazard each site presents. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.63, 300.64 (1983).
180. Once a site has been identified, the agency prepares a preliminary assessment, ex-
amining a variety of factors, such as proximity of the hazardous site to a drinking water
supply, and the fire or explosion hazards posed by the abandoned waste. See 40 C.F.R. pt.
300, app. A (1983) (uncontrolled hazardous waste site-ranking systems under the NCP).
Based on the data in its preliminary assessment, the EPA identifies the site as requiring
removal or remedial action, with planned removal a future possibility where removal is the
appropriate initial action. See supra note 16. The agency has begun the identification and
classification of sites. See supra note 35. An article published in Oct. 1983 states that 184
sites in the 29 western states and territories (Ohio to American Samoa) are on the Superfund
list for remedial action. Jones, Hazardous Waste Cleanup, a Special Report, 21 CH2M HILL
REPS., 5-6 (1983); see supra note 24.
181. Section 104 of Superfund, which authorizes cleanup, provides that plans must be
consistent with the NCP, while § 107, which authorizes recovery of costs, provides that plans
may not be inconsistent with the NCP. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (1982).
182. Id
183. See Memorandum, supra note 14.
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B. NEPA Compliance Under Superfund
Neither Superfund nor the NCP establishes specific procedures for pub-
lic participation in EPA's decisionmaking process. Superfund is silent on
the issue, providing only that the EPA must act consistently with the
NCP. 8 4 The NCP provides merely that "[i]n determining the need for
and in planning or undertaking Fund-financed action, response personnel
should, to the extent practicable ... [b]e sensitive to local community
concerns (in accordance with applicable guidance)." '85 The NCP's provi-
sion, promulgated by the EPA, is vague and leaves public participation
totally within the agency's discretion.' 86
As a result, under the NCP's provisions for remedial actions, NEPA's
two major goals are only partially implemented. '87 While planning for
remedial action requires steps that arguably parallel the environmental
balancing of NEPA's five core issues, no specific provision sets forth proce-
dures to ensure an adequate public participation opportunity.' 88 For re-
medial actions the NCP focuses on three of the five core issues: (1) the
evaluation of all feasible alternatives (including taking no action); (2) the
184. The legislative history of Superfund suggests that Congress intended NEPA to ap-
ply to Superfund nonemergency cleanup actions. The Senate Report indicates that removal
actions constitute emergency actions within the meaning of NEPA. S. REP. No. 848, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1980). Therefore, the emergency exemption to the EIS requirement is
triggered. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at 710; see also supra notes 63-64 and accompa-
nying text. However, for remedial actions, the Senate Report states that the relatively long
lead time and allowance for planning requires the EPA to provide a written assessment of
alternatives, possibly a full EIS. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1980).
The EPA has acknowledged that NEPA does apply to its response actions under
Superfund. The agency has interpreted the legislative history to mean that removal actions
fit within the "emergency" exception to the EIS requirement and that remedial actions re-
quire a functional equivalent to an EIS. The agency indicates, however, that "equivalence"
is a concept broad enough to encompass the procedures it plans to provide. See Memoran-
dum, supra note 14; Community Relations Policy, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
The Memorandum suggests the incorporation of "procedures that afford the public a mean-
ingful opportunity to comment on environmental issues before the final selection of a reme-
dial alternative," yet are more informal than the holding of a formal public hearing.
Memorandum, supra note 14, at 712. But a study of the Community Relations Policy raises
serious questions regarding whether the agency has followed the advice expressed in the
Memorandum. See supra notes 23-24; infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
185. 40 C.F.R. § 300.61(c)(3) (1983).
186. Id
187. See supra notes 5-6, 40-41 and accompanying text.
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(a) (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(e) (mandating consideration
of environmental impact); 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.68(e)(3), 300.68(g) (mandating consideration of
adverse environmental effects of proposal); 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.68(d), 300.68(g), 300.68(h),
300.68(i) (mandating consideration of alternatives); 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(h)(2) (mandating
weighing of short-term versus long-term effects); 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.68(h)(1), 300.68(i)(2)(B)
(mandating consideration of costs).
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weighing of short-term benefits against long-term harm that the cleanup
itself might cause; and (3) analysis of Costs.' 8 9 Thus, although the NCP's
provisions track the content of an EIS, there is a significant omission re-
garding procedures. Without provision for an adequate comment period,
the agency's data and conclusions may not be tested against the critical
comments of affected parties.' 90
Under its Community Relations Policy, the EPA has indicated it plans
to offer the public only a three-week, on-site comment period to review the
feasibility study before a remedial action is selected. At some sites, only a
two-week period will be offered to review the draft study of components of
remedial actions (e.g., moving drums offsite) before such actions are be-
gun.' 9 ' The EPA's major concern in its Community Relations Policy ap-
pears to be public relations: to tell the community what to expect after
important decisions have already been made, rather than to provide a
meaningful opportunity to offer opposing views.' 9 2 This aim could be
viewed as weak and self-serving, and unlikely to achieve even a public
relations purpose in communities with some sophistication regarding envi-
ronmental concerns.
NEPA imposes two types of restraints upon the EPA's actions under
Superfund: the EPA must structure its consideration of the environment
to accomplish the same balancing achieved through NEPA's five core issue
analysis, and it must provide meaningful opportunity for public participa-
tion as it reaches a decision regarding a method of cleanup. 193 These re-
straints must, of course, be analyzed in the light of each type of Superfund
response action. There is at least an argument that removal actions,
designed to mitigate immediate health hazards, fit into CEQ's emergency
provision, thereby permitting the EPA to dispense with a comment
189. Id The EPA must choose the least costly effective cleanup method. See supra note
19.
190. See supra notes 23-24, 184; see also infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
191. See Community Relations Policy, supra note 23, at 4. The Policy raises concern for
several reasons. While the agency acknowledges the importance of giving the community an
"adequate" opportunity to comment before the final site-specific plan is selected, the Policy
provides only a two or three week period for comment. Further, it fails to provide specific
guidelines regarding notification of interested parties to enable them to gather documenta-
tion to support their comments. Id. at 2-4. The Policy's greatest flaw, however, is that it is
totally discretionary: any procedures the EPA has decided to make available, it can rescind.
In no functional equivalence case, absent the emergency or statutory conflict rationale, has
the agency been totally free to provide or dispense with opportunity for public participation.
Rather, the agency has been held to compliance within its enabling statute or regulations.
See generally supra notes 75-176 and accompanying text.
192. See Community Relations Policy, supra note 23.




Similarly, for a planned removal, which is a long-term cleanup follow-
ing an emergency removal action, the response to the emergency has
placed equipment and personnel at the site.' 95 Economic benefits of pro-
ceeding with the full cleanup at that point must be weighed against the
possibility that the method being employed could cause further environ-
mental harm. It might be difficult to justify an argument that the EPA
should be halted, steamshovel already poised over corroding chemical
drums, while further comment is heard and considered.' 96 Even for
planned removal, however, streamlined procedures for comment may be
appropriate and feasible. Dissemination of plans to environmental groups
and responsible parties could produce comments that might prevent
agency error. The agency could hold a brief, informal meeting to discuss
plans and make available a file into which comments could be inserted.
Without losing momentum or incurring great cost, the EPA could meet, in
part, NEPA's public participation requirement in planned removal
actions.
C Failure to Meet NEP "s Standard
The procedures for public participation that the EPA proposes for
Superfund remedial actions fall far short of the functional equivalence
standard. That standard, developed by the District of Columbia Circuit in
Portland Cement and Weyerhaeuser, requires that the agency (1) balance
environmental costs and benefits; (2) fairly provide for public participation
at a meaningful time in the decisionmaking process; and (3) consider any
substantive comments elicited.
19 7
The proposed EPA procedures for remedial actions fail to meet the stan-
dard in several major ways. First, there is no clearly structured means to
provide adequate notice that planning has commenced for a specific site.
194. Congress evidently contemplated such hazards as leaking chemical drums next to a
playground. The Senate Report states that the intent of the legislation is "to authorize re-
moval with a minimum of delay in order to assure that injury to the public health, welfare
and the environment are prevented or minimized and mitigated." S. REP. No. 848, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1980); see 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.65 to 300.66 (1983).
195. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.66 to 300.67 (1983). Even though authorization for planned re-
moval is not provided under Superfund, the Senate Report indicates congressional intent to
achieve cost savings wherever possible by permitting "the more permanent, costly measures
which may be necessary after the need for emergency action has terminated." S. REP. No.
848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1980). The Senate Report contains no finding regarding the
need for an EIS for planned removal.
196. See id.
197. Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1027. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
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Second, no regulation mandates an opportunity for public comment early
enough in the agency's planning to be meaningful. Third, the opportunity
planned for community inspection of agency plans is far too brief to per-
mit affected or interested parties to gather documentation to support their
concerns. Finally, no regulation requires the agency to respond to com-
ments. There is, therefore, no adequate safeguard to uphold NEPA's man-
date for meaningful public participation.
The EPA cannot properly argue that the emergency nature of remedial
actions justifies minimal public participation in its decisionmaking. By
classifying a site as requiring remedial action, the EPA already has deter-
mined that the situation does not pose an imminent hazard to health, wel-
fare and the environment. 9 8 The agency has foreclosed application of the
emergency exception underlying functional equivalence cases, such as
Hathaway, Train, Warren County, and Twitty, which have deemed seri-
ously abbreviated procedures adequate under urgent circumstances. For
remedial action, where such urgency is absent, there is time to plan with
sufficient care.
The benefits of public participation are more than theoretical. In Port-
land Cement, Weyerhaeuser, and Blum, public comments drew attention to
significant factors requiring further research, analysis, and planning.' 99
Case law reveals that even the most expert and best-intentioned agency
can overlook important considerations.2 ° An open channel from the pub-
lic to the agency can reduce the possibility of potentially tragic and costly
error.20 1 Some cleanup techniques carry their own risks of harm based on
conditions peculiar to the site.2°2 The potential for harm is great in
198. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.66 & 300.68 (1983); Memorandum, supra note 14, at 711.
199. Adequate comment opportunity is not a mere exercise in open government: it
serves an essential purpose. Comment helps deter the agency from hasty or erroneous
choices. In Portland Cement, for instance, comments raised the spectre of water pollution
that could cancel out the gains from cleaner air. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
In Weyerhaeuser, comments deterred a course of action which threatened economic harm to
industry out of proportion to incremental gains in water standards. See supra notes 140-41
and accompanying text. And in Blum, comments forced the agency to reconsider an action
permitting the application of fire ant poison where it might cause harm to children and
pregnant women. See supra note 148.
200. Id.
201. As the Small Ref. Lead Phase-Down Task Force court asserted, comment forces the
agency to get its facts straight. 705 F.2d at 550. See supra note 141.
202. See Maugh, Just How Hazardous Are Dumps 215 Sci. 490, 491 (1982). Each site is
chemically and geologically unique. Where potential groundwater contamination is in-
volved, hazards can be presented by the very procedures employed to assess the problem, for
instance, the digging of monitoring wells. Maugh states that
there is no consensus on drilling methods, sampling frequency or protocol, or stan-
dard quality assurance procedures, or the number of wells needed to define the
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Superfund cleanup actions. Superfund is designed to neutralize highly
hazardous wastes. No matter how well intentioned, a hastily conceived
remedial action could exacerbate a hazardous condition the agency meant
to eliminate. Depending on conditions at a site, a remedial technique
could disperse the contaminant into the air or speed its release into the
groundwater.2 °3 Yet the EPA plans to hear those who might have signifi-
cant, peculiarly local information to offer only after its choice of action, for
all practical purposes, has been made.2"
D. Toward a Functionally Equivalent Process
To ensure a sound choice of remedial cleanup technique, the EPA
should entertain comment throughout an adequate period, one more
closely approaching equivalence to an EIS comment period than the two
to three on-site weeks now planned. The EPA has indicated that the op-
portunity for public comment may be extended upon reasonable requests
by citizens (for example, if copies of agency materials have been late in
arriving in the locality).2 °5 An extension of the comment period, however,
is to be granted only so long as it "does not exacerbate threats to public
health, welfare, or the environment at the site.' 2°6 If the problem at the
site is in danger of exacerbation from so brief a delay, however, it is argua-
bly an imminent hazard, and should have been classified as a removal
action.20 7 Thus, the EPA's Community Relations Policy reflects inconsis-
tent reasoning with regard to handling remedial actions.
On balance, the EPA has more to gain from reduced likelihood of error
than it has to lose from chance of delay. While the danger exists that re-
sponsible parties may use EIS-type comment procedures to delay remedial
problem. Many drillers are also unfamiliar with the specific techniques required
for working with hazardous wastes, and they run the risk of contaminating clean
aquifers while drilling into polluted ones.
Id.
The upper-lower aquifer geologic configuration is not uncommon. It exists, for example,
at the Western Processing Co., Inc., waste storage site at Kent, Washington. A shallow aqui-
fer lies five to six feet below the surface, above a deep water aquifer 30-40 feet below the
surface. The city of Kent plans to develop the deep aquifer as a major drinking water source
for the city. During October and November of 1982, the EPA drilled wells at the Kent site
to sample the upper aquifer below the site. See In the Matter of Western Processing Co.,
EPA Reg. 10 Order No. X83-03-23-106 (Apr. 11, 1983).
203. See supra note 18.
204. As the Community Relations Policy indicates, action may begin at some sites before
the feasibility study has been completed. See supra notes 23-24, 191-92 and accompanying
text.
205. See supra note 24.
206. Community Relations Policy, supra note 23, at 4.
207. Id.; see also supra note 24.
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208cleanup, an action's classification as remedial suggests that time is avail-
able. Furthermore, response to comments need not be burdensome be-
cause the EPA must consider only those comments "significant enough to
step over a threshold requirement of materiality. 2 °9 Responsible parties,
ultimately liable for cleanup costs,210 have great motivation to undertake
studies regarding potential adverse effects of agency-planned actions. Lo-
cal residents may need time to document facts they believe are significant
to the agency's decision. Both groups are a potentially valuable source of
information to the agency.
Moreover, the agency's consideration of comments during a more exten-
sive period would satisfy due process concerns and build a fuller record for
judicial review. The use of Superfund money for remedial cleanup re-
quires that such a record be built, for the agency essentially is using the
money of private individuals who ultimately are handed the bill.2" The
EPA's action operates concretely on individuals in their individual capac-
ity, triggering their due process right to a meaningful opportunity to be
heard, and the requirement that a record be built for judicial review.
212
Superfund's compensation scheme imposes strict liability on responsible
parties and directly affects their property rights.213 To many, that state of
affairs rings of poetic justice: those who at one time enjoyed economic
benefit from use of the dumpsite must now pay for damage done to the
environment. There is, however, a catch. Rather than mitigating a poten-
tial danger, agency error could exacerbate the harm to the environment.
Under a standard clause in Superfund cleanup contracts, the govern-
ment agrees to cover third-party claims. Liability for harm resulting from
208. See supra notes 15, 88. The NCP authorizes the EPA to permit responsible parties
to carry out remedial cleanup, with the agency required to evaluate the adequacy of their
remedial proposals according to the NCP's criteria. 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(c) (1983). The
agency, however, has indicated that it will itself conduct cleanup and later seek recovery of
costs from responsible parties. See 'Far-Reaching' Changes to RCRA, Superfund to Shift
Authority, Remove Planning Costs, [1983 Transfer Binder] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 91 (May 20,
1983).
209. The "threshold of materiality" test requires that a comment must do more than state
that the agency made a particular mistake in its basis for a decision. Rather, the comment
must show why the mistake was significant enough to affect the outcome of the agency's
deliberation. Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 394 (cited with approval in K. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 6.26 (2d ed. 1978)); see also supra note 88.
210. See supra notes 15, 208 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 15, 21; see generally Note, The Environmental Impact Statement in
Agency Enforcement Adjudication, 91 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1978).
212. See supra notes 15, 21.
213. See Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (retroactive application
of Superfund to those who obeyed existing laws at time of disposal of hazardous waste is
justified in view of congressional intent to impose strict liability).
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an improperly conducted cleanup may not extend to the parties originally
responsible for the harm. Such compensation evidently would have to
come from Superfiind.21 4 Contractors hired under Superfund are con-
cerned about the extent to which the government can indemnify them
against third-party claims. Indemnification is limited, however, to unobli-
gated funds available in the applicable appropriations under Superfund.
215
The contracts include language stating that there is no implication that
Congress will appropriate additional money if funds available are insuffi-
cient to settle any such claims.2 16 Should substantial harm result from a
poorly executed cleanup, the result might well be a bureaucratic
nightmare, with cleanup contractors rendered insolvent and some dam-
aged third parties left uncompensated.
Because the dangers of error can be reduced if the EPA offers structured
opportunity for comment, and because the nature of remedial actions
makes time for comment feasible, the NCP should be amended to incorpo-
rate four provisions that would render its procedures the functional
equivalent of an EIS:
(1) Notice should be required in the Federal Register when planning for
remedial action is initiated at a site.
(2) Notice should be required in the Federal Register when preliminary
plans are available for examination. The notice should include specific
information regarding where the plans and their supporting data will be
available. The NCP currently provides that remedial planning be done in
several stages. The early phases involve elimination of any cleanup tech-
niques that are not technologically feasible, are prohibitively expensive, or
are otherwise unsuitable.2" 7 The plans considered most feasible after the
weeding out process would be those made available for comment.
(3) The comment period should be of reasonable length-not less than
thirty days. As discussed above, by designating a site for remedial action,
the EPA has judged that lead time is available.2 18 The relative brevity of
this proposed comment period would maintain agency momentum.
(4) Notice of the final plan should be published in the Federal Register.
This plan should incorporate response to comments meeting the "thresh-
old of materiality" test.2" 9 At this point, the procedures now contemplated
by the EPA (two to three weeks of on-site inspection of the plans and pub-
214. See Liability for Claims, supra note 19.
215. Id
216. Id.
217. 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(h) (1983) (initial screening of alternatives).
218. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at 711.
219. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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lic informational meetings) would be appropriate for presentation of the
final plan.22°
Unless regulations ensure adequate opportunity for public participation,
courts should require such opportunity under the functional equivalence
standard for Superfund remedial actions. Requiring more extensive par-
ticipation procedures for remedial actions would serve three ends. First,
the agency would receive the benefit of "free" information-those expert
studies financed by responsible parties. Second, the availability of critical
comment would minimize the chance of serious agency error and develop
a fuller record for judicial review.221' Third, due process interests would be
served by ensuring responsible parties the opportunity to be heard.222 Re-
quiring true EIS equivalence for Superfund remedial actions would strike
a workable balance between the need to move forward expeditiously and
the need to make decisions carefully while affording due process to af-
fected persons.
IV. CONCLUSION
Superfund offers a unique opportunity to improve the quality of life and
safeguard the environment. Along with this opportunity, however, there is
danger of creating further harm through faulty choices of cleanup actions.
As emphasized in Portland Cement, one cannot always assume that the
EPA will be the "good guy. ' 223 And even good guys, acting in good faith,
need the full information made available through an opportunity for pub-
lic comment. It is foolhardy to presume that an agency is omniscient.
Critical comment by affected parties improves the quality of decisionmak-
ing, helping to prevent agency error.
220. See Community Relations Policy, supra note 23.
221. The EPA now plans to emphasize recovery of costs from the liable parties, rather
than first giving those parties the opportunity to perform cleanup. See 'Far-Reaching'
Changes to RCR4, Superfund, supra note 208, at 92. Thus, the agency is choosing its action
at its own discretion. It is generating on its own, without meaningful exposure to public
comment, analysis preliminary to its choice of actions. No regulation now requires the EPA
to make any mandatory period of time available for response to its proposal. See Commu-
nity Relations Policy, supra note 23. In contrast, principles of administrative law, in general,
and NEPA, in particular, require that an opportunity for responsible comment be provided
early in the agency's planning. See supra notes 21, 175 and accompanying text. The more
carefully reasoned functional equivalence cases reflect that view; the cases appearing most
deferential arguably have been applying the "emergency" exemption of the CEQ regula-
tions. Absent an emergency, the courts have looked for provisions limiting the agency's
discretion, guaranteeing the right of the public to participate meaningfully in the agency's
choices.
222. See supra notes 15, 21.
223. 486 F.2d at 384.
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The NCP currently does not adequately restrain potentially arbitrary
and capricious action. Nor is there functional equivalence in the opportu-
nity for public comment the EPA plans to make available. Yet Superfund
remedial actions offer time for careful, deliberate decisionmaking. With a
truly equivalent participation opportunity, made mandatory by regula-
tions, the agency would: (1) receive useful information, (2) reduce the like-
lihood of environmental error; (3) produce a fuller record for judicial
review, thereby serving due process interests. Superfund's unprecedented
opportunity for environmental improvement should not be squandered by
permitting hasty decisionmaking by an agency unfettered, yet unassisted,
by meaningful public participation.
Sandra . Montrose

